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7ABSTRACT
It has been argued that young preschoolers cannot
correctly attribute a false belief to a deceived actor
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Some researchers claim that the
problem lies in the child's inadequate epistemology
(Chandler & Boyes, 1982; Wellman, 1988); as such, it is
specific to the child's theory of mind and no such problem
should appear in reasoning about nonmental representations.
This prediction is tested in the first paper below in the
'false photograph' task: Here an actor takes a photograph of
an object in location x; the object is then moved to
location y. Preschool subjects are asked: "In the picture,
where is the object?" Results indicate that photographs are
no easier to reason about than are beliefs. Manipulations to
boost performance on the photograph task proved ineffective.
Further, an explanation of the failure as a processing
limitation having nothing to do with the representational
nature of beliefs or photographs was ruled out. It is
argued that young children's failure on the false belief
task is not due to an inadequate epistemology (though they
may have one) and is symptomatic of a larger problem with
representations.
8The second paper considers three possible sources of
difficulty for the young child on the false belief task:
first, the child may be unable to change the truth value of
a representation as is required in the standard false belief
task; second, the fact that the deceived actor's belief was
acquired by visual experience, normally a reliable source of
information, makes it harder for the child to consider it
false; and third, the child's own visual experience of the
object's true location, and therefore the certainty with
which the child knows the object's true location, make it
impossible to ignore. The present experiment tests these
hypotheses by contrasting the standard false belief task
with two testimony conditions. In both testimony conditions
the false belief is stipulated as false from the beginning
(the deceiver announces that he will tell a lie); no change
of truth status is involved. The difference in the two
testimony conditions is that in the 'seen' condition the
subject sees the object's true location while in the
'unseen' condition, the subject is merely told the object's
true location. Those 3-year-olds in the 'unseen' condition
successfully attributed a false belief, while 3-year-olds in
the two other conditions did not. This pattern of results
supports the third hypothesis.
9General Introduction
The research project reported here is grounded in a
debate about the very nature of cognitive growth. Piaget
argued that cognitive growth is domain-general, that the
child's logical system changes in an invariant manner -- in
a series of stages -- and that these changes ramify through
the child's conceptual system, leading to improvement in a
variety of reasoning tasks in different cognitive domains
(e.g., number, language, morality).
The alternative domain-specific approach (Carey, 1985a)
holds that cognitive development is largely a matter of
domain-specific knowledge acquisition. On this view, the
child is different from the adult not because the child has
an inferior logic or representational system but simply
because the child is a novice in so many domains in which
the adult has already acquired expertise. This view
suggests that the best research strategy is to focus on a
single domain or 'theory', to try to describe its initial
state, and to trace its development over time. This
strategy is evident in the current literature on the child's
understanding of number (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978), of
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physical objects (Spelke, 1987), and of biology (Carey,
1985b).
The domain under investigation in the present work is
the child's theory of mind. This domain was chosen for
several reasons: first, it is obviously an important area of
knowledge. It's very hard to imagine how the child could
predict or explain the behavior of others without it, and
such understanding must surely be a central goal of early
childhood. Similarly, the child's concept of self would be
radically different from our own if it did not include the
understanding that people are intentional beings, thinking
and feeling beings. For these reasons, a theory of mind has
seemed a plausible candidate for a universal competence and
even, according to Fodor (1987), an innate competence.
This was straightforwardly denied by Piaget (1929), who
claimed that the physical and mental worlds were one
undifferentiated whole to the young child:
"Let us imagine a being, knowing nothing of the
distinction between mind and body. Such a being would be
aware of his desires and feelings but his notions of self
would undoubtedly be much less clear than ours. Compared
with us he would experience much less the sensation of the
thinking self within him, the feeling of a being independent
of the external world. The knowledge that we are thinking
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of things severs us in fact from the actual things. But,
above all, the psychological perceptions of such a being
would be entirely different from our own. Dreams, for
example, would appear to him as a disturbance breaking in
from without. Words would be bound up with things and to
speak would mean to act directly on these things.
Inversely, external things would be less material and would
be endowed with intentions and will...We shall try to prove
that such is the case with the child. The child knows
nothing of the nature of thought..."
Piaget's claim now seems wrong for two reasons. First,
young preschoolers have been shown to have an impressive
understanding of physical causality. (Bullock, Gelman, and
Baillargeon, 1982; Shultz, 1982). Second, there is a
growing literature, most of it by Wellman and his
colleagues, documenting the child's awareness of the domain
of the mind. In a series of studies which investigated
children's understanding of the brain (Johnson and Wellman,
1982), children were asked whether the brain was needed to
perform a wide variety of activities. Among the activities
mentioned were mental acts (such as knowing and
remembering), sensory acts (such as seeing and hearing),
school tasks (such as reading and writing), involuntary acts
(such as coughing), and complex tasks (such as hopping on
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one foot). Also included were three sets of 'feeling'
items: physiological sensations (feeling hungry or sleepy),
emotions (feeling happy or sad), and 'cognitive' feelings
(feeling sure or curious). The results indicated that
kindergarteners judged the brain necessary for such
paradigmatic mental acts as remembering and thinking, for
the school tasks of reading and writing, and for feeling
sure. Wellman (1985) has argued from these results that
young children view the brain as the locus of a number of
different purely mental processes; in short, he has claimed,
they have a concept of mind.
Similar studies with still younger children (Johnson &
Wellman, 1982) revealed a similar picture for 4 year-olds;
in fact, even for the 3 year-olds, paradigmatically mental
acts were most frequently judged as requiring the brain. As
Wellman points out, these results argue against Piaget's
view cited above; the brain and its activities were seen as
internal and nonbehavioral even by preschoolers.
Wellman and Estes (1986) invesigated the young
preschooler's understanding of the ontological properties of
mental states. They presented preschoolers with a number
of contrasting characters (e.g., a boy who had a dog vs. a
boy who was thinking about a dog). The child was then asked
to make the following judgements for each dog: Can it be
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seen, touched, and petted? Can someone else see it? Can
the boy pet it tomorrow? Even 3-year-olds performed well on
this task, understanding that real objects, but not mental
entities, afford behavioral-sensory evidence (can be seen,
etc.), have public existence (can be seen by anyone
present), and have consistent existence (won't just dissolve
or disappear in the way that thoughts or mental images can).
Wellman (1988) has therefore claimed that 3-year-olds are in
the same theoretical ballpark as adults with respect to the
mental realm; they are, essentially, ontological dualists.
There is good evidence, then, that even 3-year-olds
posit the existence of a domain of mental states, and that
this domain is similar in many basic ways to the domain of
the adult's theory. Still, one may ask just how well they
reason about the mental realm; what kind of inferences are
supported by their knowledge of this particular domain? It
has been claimed, for instance, that although 3-year-olds
believe in the existence of a mental realm, it is "divorced
from the causal fabric of the world" (Leslie, 1987); that
is, young children do not understand that beliefs can be the
causes and effects of events in the material world.
Dennett (1978) has suggested that success on a task of
the following form would constitute strong evidence of a
theory of mind:
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1) Child believes that Actor believes that p.
2) Child believes that Actor desires that q.
3) Child infers from his beliefs in (1) and (2) that
Actor will therefore do x.
In an early paper not reported here (Zaitchik, 1986),
Dennett's paradigm was used to test the ability of young
preschoolers to make simple inferences of the following
types: given information about an actor's beliefs and
desires, to predict the actor's behavior; given information
about an actor's belief and behavior, to infer the actor's
desire; and given information about an actor's desire and
behavior, to infer the actor's belief. Overall, 3-year-olds
were quite successful on these tasks. Recently, Wellman and
Bartsch (in press) and Bartsch and Wellman (in press) also
addressed this issue using a similar methodology, but with
several control conditions which attempted to rule out the
possibility that the child's successful prediction of an
actor's behavior may be acheived without any real
understanding of mental states. Here too 3-year-olds were
successful.
These successes stand in stark contrast to the failure
of 3-year-olds on a task which has become the center of the
entire debate about the child's theory of mind. In this
task, the belief which the child must attribute to the actor
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(step 1 of Dennett's syllogism) is false. This, Dennett
(1978) has argued, is the best evidence that the child
understands the concept of belief, because in this case only
can we be sure that the child is not successfully predicting
where the actor will look on the basis of other information,
such as where the object really is.
In the false belief task, preschoolers are presented
with stories with the following format:
1. Actor A sees an object in location x.
2. In his absence, the object is moved to location y.
Test Question: Where will Actor A look for the object?
In Experiment 1, below, we presented preschoolers with
the false belief task. In addition to the test question
above, children were asked three other questions. First,
children were asked the Ignorance probe question: Does Actor
A know where the object is? This question was included
because it had been claimed to help some children make the
correct inference on the Belief test question (Hogrefe,
Wimmer, and Perner, 1986). This question was immediately
followed by the Belief question: Where does Actor A think it
is? This test question was included because it seemed
plausible that using a mental state verb ("think") rather
than an action verb ("look") might help some children to
focus better on the actor's mental state. The Think
16
question was immediately followed by the Look question, the
traditional question used to assess the child's ability to
understand false belief. Finally, the Reality control
question was included to make sure that children understood
the events which transpired in the puppet skit; if not,
their responses on the test questions would be
uninterpretable.
Experiment 1
Method
Subjects
Thirty children from daycare centers in the Boston area
participated in this study. There were ten subjects in each
of the following age groups: 3.0-3.7 (mean age 3.3), 3.9-4.3
(mean age 4.0),and 4.4-5.0 (mean age 4.9).
Materials
A large cardboard box with its bottom removed served as
a puppet theater. Props included four familiar Sesame St.
puppets, some toy cookies, a doll's hat, and several empty
boxes.
Procedure and Design
Each child was shown two skits (See sample story
below). The order of presentation of skits was
counterbalanced.
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Story One
This is Big Bird's (BB) house. Over here is the door. This
is the upstairs, and down here is the downstairs, where BB
likes to watch t.v. One day Cookie Monser (CM) comes to
visit BB. He knocks on the door.
BB: "Hi, Cookie Monster. What are you doing here?"
CM: "I came to play with you. I thought we could watch t.v.
together."
BB: "Good idea."
CM sees a bag of cookies and a box.
CM: "Is that a bag of cookies?"
BB: "Yes."
CM: "May I have one?"
BB: "Well, okay."
CM: "Yum... could I have another one?"
BB: (less happily) "Okay. Come on, let's go down and watch
t.v."
They go downstairs and what do you think they watch on t.v.?
Sesame St! Cookie Monster is so excited to see himself on
t.v.! Meanwhile, Big Bird is worried. He doesn't want
Cookie Monster to eat all his cookies. He quietly sneaks
upstairs. He hides the cookies in the shoebox. (Can you
help him?) Then he closes everything up just like it was
before. Meanwhile, Cookie Monster is so busy watching t.v.
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that he doesn't even know Big Bird left the room.
[At this point in the session, children were asked the
IGNORANCE QUESTION:] Does CM know where the cookies are now?
Experimenter then continues: Pretty soon CM wants another
cookie. He goes upstairs.
The Questions
The skit was immediately followed by three questions,
in the order presented below:
THINK QUESTION: Where does CM think the cookies are?
LOOK QUESTION: Where will he look for them?
REALITY CONTROL QUESTION: Where are they really?
Results
All answers to the REALITY CONTROL question were
correct. Table 1 shows mean scores for each age and
question. Table 2 shows the distribution of scores by age
and question. All incorrect responses to the THINK and LOOK
questions consisted in pointing to the actual location of
the object.
A 3-way ANOVA was run for effects of age, order of
skits, and type of question. There was a significant main
effect for age (F=27.32, df= 2,18, p<.001). Subjects in the
middle group were significantly better than subjects in the
youngest group (F=11.43, df= 1,18, p<.002, one-tailed) and
subjects in the oldest group were marginally better than
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subjects in the middle group (F=4.45, df= 1,18, p<.05, one-
tailed). Effects of order and question type failed to reach
significance.
Considering performance on the THINK question, the
oldest group was perfect, while the middle group performed
better than chance (t=7.86, df=9, p <.001 two-tailed). The
youngest group performed significantly worse than chance
(t=8.437, df=9, p<.001, two-tailed). Performance on the
LOOK question was in line with these results, especially for
the oldest group which was nearly perfect. Although mean
scores on the LOOK question were similar to those on the
THINK question, neither of the two younger groups was
statistically different from chance on the LOOK question;
for each, t(9)=1.5, p<.2, two-tailed. One might speculate
that if children realized that the two test questions were
addressing the same underlying question, the difference in
performance might be due to pragmatic considerations. That
is, some children might have concluded that their first
answer (to the THINK question) must have been wrong;
otherwise, why would the experimenter ask them the same
(underlying) question again (in the form of the LOOK
question). If some children made this assumption,
performance on the LOOK question for the youngest group
would have improved (since they performed poorly on the
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THINK question) while performance for the middle group would
have worsened (since they performed well on the THINK
question). Given this pragmatic problem with the LOOK
question, performance on the THINK question is probably a
better indicator of children's understanding.
These results replicate the findings of Wimmer and
Perner (1983). In a series of studies with preschoolers,
they found that 4-years-olds generally succeeded on the
false belief task, correctly claiming that the deceived
actor would look in location x because 'that's where he saw
it'. Most 3-year-olds, however, claimed that the actor
would look in location y, because 'that's where it is'.
This finding has now been replicated many times with many
interesting variations in the task (Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner
(1986); Perner, Leekam,& Wimmer (1987); Gopnik & Astington,
(1980). For instance, Hogrefe et al. maximized the salience
of the false belief in the following way: they presented
subjects with a box of Smarties, a popular brand of candy in
England, and asked subjects what they thought was inside.
All subjects responded that they thought it was Smarties (or
candy). Subjects were then shown that the box contained
only a pencil. The box was closed again. Subjects were then
told that another child would soon be brought into the room.
They were asked what this other child would think was in the
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box when he or she first looked at it all closed up.
Subjects responded, "a pencil". Even though they themselves
had just been tricked with the same candy box, they
nevertheless failed to attribute the same false belief to
another child.
In another variation on the Smarties task (Gopnik &
Astington), subjects were asked what they thought was in the
closed candy box, then shown its contents. Instead of being
asked what someone else would think was in the closed box,
they were asked what they themselves had thought was in the
box before they opened it. Remarkably, subjects claimed
that they thought all along that there was a pencil in the
box! In sum, the 3-year-old's difficulty with false beliefs
is a robust finding.
The following two papers are investigations of the 3-
year-old's difficulty on the false belief task. In the
first paper, the focus is the issue of domain-specificity.
Is the young preschooler's inability to attribute false
beliefs just a species of his or her inability to understand
misrepresentation in general; that is, does the child have a
problem only with beliefs? In the second paper, the focus
is on the generality of the child's problem with false
beliefs; that is, does the child have a problem with all
false beliefs. These questions address the scope of the
22
child's problem; knowing the boundaries of the phenomenon
will help us to decide which proposed explanations are most
likely.
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Table 1
Mean scores by age and question
Youngest:
3.1-3.7
Ig Q
Think Q
Look Q
35%
20%
30%
Middle:
3.9-4.3
90%
80%
70%
Oldest:
4.5-4.11
100%
100%
95%
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Table 2
Frequency of S's getting both (100%), one (50%),
or neither (0%) trial right, by age and question
Youngest:
3.1-3.7
Middle:
3.9-4.3
Oldest:
4.5 -4.11
100%
Ig Q 3
Think Q 2
Look Q 2
50%
1
0
2
0% 100%
6
8
6
8
7
6
50%
2
2
2
0% 100%
0 10
1 10
2 9
50%
0
0
1
0%
0
0
0TO
TO

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When representations conflict with reality: The
preschooler's problem with false beliefs and 'false'
photographs
The adult's naive theory of mind involves the
attribution to ourselves and others of intentional states
such as beliefs and desires. Does the young child share
this belief-desire framework for understanding human
behavior? This question is important because a theory of
mind is likely to be a universal competence. Furthermore,
intentional concepts are crucially important to social
cognition in general; one can scarcely imagine making sense
of human behavior without them. Indeed, Fodor (1987) has
argued that a theory of mind is innately specified, that the
kind of social coordination which our species exhibits could
not have evolved without this innate component.
In this vein, Wellman and Estes (1986) give convincing
evidence that very young children share the adult
metaphysics of mind. They presented preschoolers with a
number of contrasting characters (e.g., a boy who had a dog
vs. a boy who was thinking about a dog). The child was then
asked to make the following judgements for each dog: Can it
be seen, touched, and petted? Can someone else see it? Can
the boy pet it tomorrow? Even 3-year-olds performed well on
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this task, understanding that real objects, but not mental
entities, afford behavioral-sensory evidence (can be seen,
etc.), have public existence (can be seen by anyone
present), and have consistent existence (won't just dissolve
or disappear in the way that thoughts or mental images can).
Wellman (1988) has therefore claimed that 3-year-olds are in
the same theoretical ballpark as adults with respect to the
mental realm; they are, essentially, ontological dualists.
While there is evidence that young children share the
adult's metaphysical notions of the mind, one may still ask
just how skillfully they can attribute beliefs to self and
others. Premack and Woodruff (1978) argued that this
ability is evidence of a theory of mind, "because such
states are not directly observable, and the system can be
used to make predictions about the behavior of others." Can
the young child use information about beliefs and desires to
predict the behavior of others? Dennett (1978) suggested
the following paradigm to test this ability:
1) Child believes that Actor believes that p.
2) Child believes that Actor desires that q.
3) Child infers from his beliefs in (1) and (2) that
Actor will therefore do x.
Wimmer and Perner (1983) adapted Dennett's paradigm to
test the ability of young children to correctly attribute a
false belief to a deceived actor. It was important that the
beliefs be false because only then could one be sure that
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the attribution was being made the right way-- not on the
basis of the way the world is, but on the basis of the
actor's exposure to the world. In a series of experiments,
Wimmer and Perner presented preschoolers with two stories in
which an actor places an object in location x; in his
absence the object is moved to location y. The child is
then asked to predict where the deceived actor thinks the
object is. The results indicated that children do not
acquire the ability to correctly attribute a false belief
until about their fourth birthday.
Several researchers have recently claimed that the
problem lies squarely in the child's theory of mind
(Chandler & Boyes, 1982; Wellman, 1988; Flavell (1988);
Pillow (in press). Chandler and Boyes (1982) have claimed
that the younger child is a 'copytheorist' while the older
child is, like the adult, a 'constructivist'. The
copytheorist takes thoughts to be nothing more than mental
copies of events in the world which somehow impress
themselves on the mind of whoever is in their path. With
this copytheory, the child can conceive of knowledge (just
in case one was in the path) or ignorance (just in case one
wasn't in the path); the child cannot, however, conceive of
false belief. Wellman (1988) fixes the source of this
misconception in the failure to conceive of the mind as an
active interpretive, analytic machine--an information
processor; instead, the mind is conceived to be merely a
28
bucket into which thoughts are dropped. Without a
cognitivist view of the mind, the child posits no internal
processes. The copytheory, then, specifies no mechanism by
which a false belief, indeed any belief, could be acquired.
If the copytheorist understands nothing of the role of
perceptual mechanisms in acquiring information, then he or
she is forced to look to the external world as the sole
source of beliefs. Older children, on the other hand,
appreciate the active role of the mind in fixing our beliefs
about the world. Understanding that the mind interprets
experience, they can use information about an actor's
perceptual experience to predict his or her belief.
Wellman's claim, then, is that children have the ontology
straight before they understand the epistemology (Estes,
Wellman, & Wooley, in press).
Leslie (1987) has further claimed that the child's
problems with epistemology actually stem from his or her
grasp of the ontology; that is, understanding that thoughts
are immaterial, private, and not permanent, the child cannot
imagine how the material world could cause them. Mental
states thus remain divorced from the 'causal fabric' of the
world. Development, on this view, involves coming to
understand perception as the bridge between the world and
the mind.
A recent study by Wimmer, Hogrefe, and Perner (1988)
supports the claim that young children do not understand
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that perceptual experience plays a causal role in belief
formation. Here pairs of 3-year-olds, one of whom was
designated as the subject, viewed the contents of a box. By
and large, subjects correctly claimed that they knew the
contents but failed to correctly attribute knowledge to the
other child, even though the other child had the same visual
access to the object that the subject had. These data
support the view that the impressive development occurring
between ages 3 and 4 is best characterized as conceptual
change within the child's theory of mind.
If the child's problem lies in her inadequate theory of
mind, then it is a problem limited to mental entities; the
'copytheory' account does not predict any problem with
nonmental representations. That's just because what's hard
about mental representations is that they're mental. If so,
the child should have no problem with nonmental
representations. To test this prediction of the copytheory
hypothesis, we designed a task which posed the same problem
for the child as the Wimmer and Perner task, but in which
photographs take the place of beliefs. To see how this
works, notice the similarity of the following two formats:
Belief format
1) Actor A places object in location x and then leaves.
2) Actor B moves object to location y.
3) Test question: "Where does A think the object is?"
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Photo format
1) Actor A places object in location x and takes a
photo of it.
2) Actor B moves object to location y.
3) Test question: "In the picture, where is the
object?"
[Of course, the front of the photo will not be visible
to the child.]
If young preschoolers succeed on the photo task while
failing the belief task, this would support the view that
the difficulty on the false belief task stems from the
child's misunderstanding of belief. Those explanations for
the problem which focus on demands of the task which are
specific to the mental domain (e.g., an understanding of the
mind as an interpretive device, an understanding that mental
entities play a causal role in the physical world, etc.)
would be supported. On the other hand, if children are no
better at the photo task than they are at the belief task,
then lack of knowledge about the mind per se is probably an
inadequate explanation of the child's problem with false
beliefs. This result would support the view that
explanations should focus on those properties which beliefs
share with photographs -- their representational status.
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Experiment 1
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 14 3-year-olds (mean age 3.6, range 2.11-
4.0), 18 4-year-olds (mean age 4.8, range 4.1-5.1), and 14 5
year olds (mean age 5.9, range 5.4-6.4). All the children
attended daycare centers in the Boston area. Groups included
roughly equal numbers of boys and girls.
Procedure
Each subject started the session with a pretraining
period on the use of two cameras, a toy one and a real
Polaroid camera. The subject was told that to use the toy
camera you had to look through the little window until you
saw the object to be photographed and you had to then push
the button. After letting the child take a 'pretend'
picture with this toy camera, the experimenter presented the
Polaroid camera. The experimenter told the subject that
this camera also had a window and a little button to push.
The child was further told that when the button was pushed,
there would be a flash of light (the flashbulb was pointed
out) and a grinding noise, and that then the picture would
come out of the camera. The subject was told that when the
picture first came out, it would be all white, but that
after a minute the colors would start to show, and that they
would get brighter and brighter until the picture was done.
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The child was then given the Polaroid camera and told
to look through the little window until the puppet (which
the subject was allowed to choose from a large selection of
puppets) was visible in the middle. When the child had
focussed the camera on the puppet and appeared to be ready,
the experimenter checked with the child that he or she could
see the puppet in the middle of the window. The child was
then told to push the button. As promised, the child heard
a grinding noise, saw the flash of light, and saw the blank
photo emerge from the machine. Together the experimenter
and child watched the photo develop. During this period,
the experimenter pointed out the progress of the development
with comments such as the following: "Look, there's Ernie! I
can just begin to see Ernie. He'll get clearer and clearer.
Soon the colors will come out better and you'll be able to
see it more clearly." And a few seconds later, "Look, now I
can see his hat!" When the photo seemed finished, the child
was given it to take home, along with lots of praise for
having taken such a nice picture. Subjects were then told
that they would see some little puppet shows and that in
some of them the puppets would get to take pictures.
Following the pretraining period, subjects in the two
younger groups were presented with four puppet skits, two
skits with the belief format and two with the photo format
(see sample skits below). In one of the photo skits the
experimenter used the Polaroid camera and took a real
33
picture; in the other, the experimenter used a small toy
camera and took a 'pretend' picture. Within the photo
condition, the real camera trial always preceded the toy
camera trial, and within the belief condition Skit 1 always
preceded Skit 2. The order of conditions was
counterbalanced. The oldest group was tested only on the
photo condition, since numerous studies have shown that even
4-year-olds succeed on the belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie,
& Frith, 1985; Johnson & Maratsos, 1977; Perner, Leekam, &
Wimmer, 1987).
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Belief Skit 1
Walter (W) is a little boy puppet with a bag of marbles; he
is 'upstairs' (on-stage) in his bedroom. His bedroom
contains a bed and a toybox. His mother (M), an adult
puppet, is seen 'downstairs' (off-stage).
W: Oh boy, I can't wait to play with my new marbles. I just
got them yesterday.
M: (calling from downstairs): Walter, it's time for dinner;
come wash your hands.
W: (disappointed) Oh, Mom; do I have to?
M: Yes, you do.
W: All right.
W: tells Subject: Well, I'll just leave my marbles here on
my bed. I'll come back and get them after dinner.
[Walter then leaves to wash his hands. In his absence,
his mother enters his bedroom.
M: (complaining to Subject) Oh, that silly boy; he always
leaves his toys lying around all over the place. I'll
just put his marbles back in his toybox. (She does so.)
There. Now his marbles are safe and sound inside his
toybox.
Ignorance Probe Question: Does Walter know where his marbles
are now?
Test Question: Where does Walter think his marbles are?
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Belief Skit 2 differed from Skit 1 in that it involved
intentional deception; Actor B was puposely hiding something
from Actor A (see appendix).
Camera Skit 1
Bert [B] and Ernie [E] are on-stage with a camera.
B: Gee, Ernie, I'm so glad we bought a new camera. Let's
take a picture of Rubber Duckie, okay? Here, I'll just
take her out of her bathtub and put her here on the bed.
(Bert looks through the window of the camera.) Okay,
Ernie, I see her. (Bert snaps the button.) [In the real
photo condition, he holds the picture up facing himself.]
There, that'll make a nice picture!
E: Hmm, I'm really tired now. (He looks at his bed.) I
guess I'll just pick Rubber Duckie up off the bed and put
her back in the bathtub where she belongs.
[Experimenter holds the photo up to focus subject's
attention on it, but does not let subject see its front.]
Test Question: In the picture, where is Rubber Duckie?
Camera Skit 2 was identical to Skit 1 except for the
following substitutions: a toy dinosaur replaced Rubber
Duckie, a toyshelf replaced the bathtub, and other Sesame
Street puppets were used.
The ignorance probe question. Notice that the belief
condition included an ignorance probe question immediately
before the belief question. This probe question was
included because it had been shown to help subjects on the
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belief test question that followed (Wimmer & Perner, 1985).
Since cameras don't have minds, there is no exactly
analogous probe question for the camera condition.
Nevertheless, the probe question was included in the belief
condition; since our intention was to test whether the
camera condition was easier than the belief condition, we
tried to optimize subjects' chances of success on the belief
condition.
Results and Discussion
Belief Condition
Results are shown in Table 1. As in the literature, 4 year
olds succeeded while 3 year olds did not (Baron-Cohen,
Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Johnson & Maratsos, 1977; Perner,
Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987).
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The level of accuracy of the younger group (54%
correct) was surprising; their performance was not different
from chance (chance=50%), although several previous studies
had shown them to be systematically worse than chance
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986). A
closer look at the data clarified the situation. For this
analysis, the 3-year-olds were divided into two groups, 3.0-
3.7 and 3.8-4.0. The percentage of correct responses was 10%
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for the younger group (n=5) and 78% for the older group
(n=9). This accords nicely with data from an earlier study
(Zaitchik, 1984) using the same false belief paradigm; in
this study, subjects were divided equally (n=10 in each) in
3 age groups: 3.0-3.7, 3.8-4.3, and 4.4-5.0. The percentage
of correct responses were, respectively, 20%, 80%, and 100%.
These data suggest that the switch from systematically
incorrect to systematically correct responding comes just a
few months before the fourth birthday, at least in the
middle-class population of the present studies.
Five subjects got only one belief skit right; in every
case, it was the skit involving intentional deception (p
<.05, binomial, one-tailed). Subjects found the task easier
when the false belief was explicitly motivated than when
there was no such motivation.
Camera Condition
As can be seen from Table 1, both 3 year olds and 4 year
olds performed at chance (chance=50%). Only the 5 year olds
were, as a group, better than chance on the camera condition
(t =3.2, df=13, p <.01 two-tailed).
Although the younger groups were not better than
chance, subjects were not just guessing. Scores were
bimodally distributed; for the most part, subjects were
either systematically right or systematically wrong.
Pooling the data of the two younger groups on the camera
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condition, a contingency test over the two trials yielded a
C =.59, chi-square (1)=17.7, p =<.001.
Six subjects got only one of the camera skits right; in
every case, it was the real photograph condition that they
succeeded on (p <.02, binomial, two-tailed). Since the real
photograph trial was always presented first, it is possible
that this was an order effect. Equally plausible, however,
is that the presence of a real photograph, even one whose
front could not be seen, served to help subjects on the test
question.
An ANOVA for effects of age, condition (belief vs.
camera) and order of presentation for the two younger groups
showed a main effect of age only (F (1,30)= 5.4, p <.03).
Our data do not show that the camera condition is harder
than the belief condition, although they do hint at it.
Still, the real surprise is that it is not easier. Pictures
are, after all, more concrete than beliefs; they can be
seen, handled, even torn into pieces. Nevertheless, simple
photos, which seem to wear their representational nature on
their sleeve, are no easier to reason about than are
beliefs.
Before concluding that the representation of mental and
nonmental events pose a similar problem for the preschooler,
several other explanations for why the photo task was as
difficult as the belief task needed to be ruled out.
Experiments 2-5 were conducted in order to test the
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following hypotheses: 1) that the there were greater
inferential demands in the photo task (Exp. 2); 2) that the
critical information was less salient in the photo task
(Exp. 3); 3) that the difficulty in both tasks is a
processing problem which has nothing to do with the
representational status of beliefs and photos (Exps. 3 and
4); 4) that the problem on both tasks is in the timing of
the inference, not the nature of the inference (Exp. 5).
Experiment 2
As mentioned above, it might be objected that the two
conditions of Experiment 1 are not exactly equated in terms
of their inferential demands. After all, the belief
condition included the ignorance probe question which served
to help the child make the first step toward the inference
about the puppet's false belief. Perhaps the child could
more easily make the inference about the photographic
representation if she was helped to get halfway there. In
Experiment 2, the following two probe questions were
inserted into the photo condition immediately before the
test question:
Probe 1: Where is (the object) now?
Probe 2: Where was (the object) when they took the
picture?
Test Question: In the picture, where is the object?
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Experiment 2 tests the hypothesis that 4-year-old
children will succeed in the photo condition as well as the
belief condition when the inferential demands are the same.
Method
Subjects
Subjects included 27 four-year-olds (mean age 4.7,
range 3.11-5.1), with roughly equal numbers of girls and
boys. One of these subjects was eliminated from the study
because he answered a probe question incorrectly; he was the
only child to do so.
Procedure
Except for the addition of the two probe questions in
the camera condition, the procedure was identical to the
procedure of Experiment 1. There were no changes in either
the pretraining or the belief conditions; the skits
themselves were identical to those in Experiment 1. The
order of presentation of the new probe questions was
counterbalanced as well as the order of condition type.
Results and Discussion
As mentioned above, all but one subject (whose data
were not analyzed further) answered the two probe questions
in the camera condition correctly. Although the probe
questions were included in the task for another reason, they
did in fact rule out the possibility that failure on the
test question was due to a memory problem; that is, subjects
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knew where the object was when the photograph was snapped,
and where it was 'now'.
Results are shown in Table 2. The percentage of
correct responses was 94% in the belief condition and 72% in
the camera condition. Once again, performance on the belief
condition for 4-year-olds was virtually perfect, and better
than performance on the camera condition [F (1,24)=6.7, p
<.02]. Once again, however, subjects were not answering
randomly in the camera condition. A contingency test over
responses on the two trials showed that subjects answered
systematically (C =.47, chi-square (1)= 7.22 p <.01).
Of the five subjects who responded correctly on only
one of the camera skits, all of them succeeded with the
'pretend' photo rather than the real photo (p =.06,
binomial, two-tailed). Since Experiment 2 did not replicate
the advantage of the 'real' photo that was evident in
Experiment 1, we considered these to be spurious effects. In
all subsequent camera studies, we used only the real camera
in both pretraining and testing.
In sum, although subjects answered them correctly, the
probe questions did not facilitate correct responses to the
test question.
Although 4-year-olds, as a group, were nearly perfect
in the belief condition, they were not better than chance on
the camera condition.
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Experiment 3
Perhaps one source of difficulty on the camera task is
that the object's location is simply not a very salient
aspect of the event for the child. Children may have
performed better if they had been asked about an aspect of
the event they were more likely to have attended to: the
object's identity, rather than its location. In the camera
condition of Experiment 3 there was only one salient
location; one actor was at that location when the picture
was taken but he was replaced by another actor before the
test question was asked.
Information-processing problem?
Experiment 3 was designed to test another hypothesis as
well, using a new procedure. Perhaps failure on the camera
task reflects a general limitation in the young child's
information-processing capacity. On this view the child's
problem is an inability to track the different consequences
for two different objects of a machine which operates over
only one of them. To see what this means, consider the
camera condition under the following description: object 1
is oriented toward the mechanism; the mechanism operates
over object 1; this operation results in a certain
consequence for object 1, namely a photographic
representation of it; now object 2 is oriented toward the
mechanism but the mechanism does not operate over object 2;
therefore there is no consequence. In the camera task the
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input to the machine consists in the object being placed
before the lens, the single operation performed is the
pressing of the button, and the consequence is the photo.
It could be that keeping track of all this is just too hard
for the child. The important point here is that the child's
failure has nothing to do with the representational nature
of photographs; that is, even where the consequence of the
mechanism's operation is not a representation, the child
will fail. If this is true, then all the arguments about
the difficulty of representations, mental or pictorial,
would lose much of their force.
To test this hypothesis a simple mechanical device was
constructed, the "gizmo", illustrated in Figure 1. The
gizmo was constructed by glueing an empty cardboard tube
onto a larger piece of cardboard which supported it at
roughly a 30 degree angle from the upright. Approximately 2
inches from the top of the tube, a red rod was inserted
through the tube, thereby blocking the hole so that nothing
could drop down the tube until the red rod was removed. On
a given trial, one object was inserted and the rod was
pulled, releasing the object into the concealed lower
compartment. A second object was then placed into the tube,
but the rod was not pulled, so the object remained in the
upper part of the tube.
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INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
To see how this gizmo is a nonrepresentational analog
to the camera description given above, consider the
following: it is a mechanism on which a single operation
(pulling out the rod) can be performed, there are two
objects which serve as input, one of which is operated on
and one of which is not (although it is oriented with
respect to the mechanism), and the operation has a
consequence for the object -- this time not a
representation, of course -- this time the consequence for
the object is a change of location (the drop down the tube).
Mechanism Operation Input Orientation Consequence
Camera push button objects in front of photograph
camera
Gizmo pull rod toys placed into location change
top
Experiment 3 tests the hypothesis that failure on the
camera task is due to information-processing demands which
have nothing to do with the representational nature of
photographs. The prediction is that children will perform
just as badly on the gizmo task as they do on the camera
task.
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Method
Subjects
Subjects included 16 3-yr-olds (mean age 3.6, range
2.11-3.10) and 16 4- and 5-year-olds (mean age 4.9, range
4.2-5.6) from local daycare centers. Groups included
roughly equal numbers of girls and boys.
Procedure for the camera condition
Each subject was presented with two puppet skits with
the following format:
1. Actor A is photographed in location x and then moves
away.
2. Actor B now moves into location x.
3. Test question: In the picture, who is in location x?
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Camera Skit 1
Ernie and Bert are outside in the sun. Bert is lying on the
mat and Ernie is taking Bert's picture.
E: Okay, Bert, I can see you through the little window; now
I'll just press the button. (He does so). There, that'll
make a nice picture.
Experimenter tells Subject that Bert is getting too hot
lying in the sun.
B: Ernie, I'm really hot; let's go inside.
E: Okay, good buddy; I'm coming.
Experimenter says to Subject: Oh, look, here comes Big Bird.
BB: Hmm, look at that, someone left a camera here; well, I
think I'll lie down on this mat for a while and have a
rest.
[Experimenter holds the photo up to focus Subject's
attention on it, but does not let Subject see its front.]
Test Question: In the picture, who is lying on the mat?
Camera Skit 2 was identical to Skit 1 except for the
substitution of other Sesame Street puppets and a bathtub
instead of a mat.
Procedure for gizmo condition
The experimenter presented the gizmo machine along with
several small toys, all of which were small enough to slide
down the tube of the gizmo when the red rod was removed, but
large enough to remain stuck at the top when the rod was in
place. (Examples of the stimuli include a tiny toy cow, a
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marble, and a large die.) When an object was inserted into
the tube, and the red rod pulled out, the object slid down
to the bottom of the tube into a small trap; although the
child could hear the object as it slid down the tube and
into the trap, he could not see into the trap. The
experimenter demonstrated the simple workings of the
machine, making sure that the child saw the toy stuck at the
top while the rod was in. She then invited the child to
choose a toy and to operate the machine. Children did this
several times with different objects to ensure their
familiarity with the machine.
After this short pretraining, the test procedure
followed: the child was asked to choose an object and insert
it into the tube; the red rod was removed and the object
slid down into the trap. The red rod was reinserted. The
child was not allowed to remove the object from the trap as
in the pretraining; rather, the child was asked to pick
another object and place it in the tube. The red rod was
not removed, so the object was stuck at the top. The child
was then asked the test questions: Where is (object 1)?
Where is (object 2)?. Each child was given two trials of the
gizmo condition and two trials of the camera condition.
48
Results and Discussion
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Camera condition
Results on the camera trials are shown in Table 3.
Replicating Experiments 1 and 2, the performance of the
older group (63%) was not better than chance (t=1.15,
df=15). The younger group, which scored only 25%, was worse
than chance (t=-2.7, df=15, p <.02 two-tailed). Clearly,
asking about an actor's identity rather than his location
did not help subjects of either age.
This new test question incidentally ruled out another
possible objection to Experiments 1 and 2--specifically,
that the test question, "In the picture, where is Rubber
Duckie?" is ambiguous. Leslie (personal communication) has
pointed out that the child may have taken the question to
mean "show me the place in the picture where Rubber Duckie
is now", as if the picture were a map. The camera format of
Experiment 3 makes such a reading highly unlikely. Here the
test question "In the picture, who is lying on the mat?"
seems resistant to such an ambiguity. Children's failure in
this camera condition support the claim that failure in
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Experiments 1 and 2 was not due to a misinterpretation of
the test question.
Gizmo condition
Results are shown in Table 4.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
In the gizmo condition, older subjects were perfect;
younger subjects, with 70% right, were better than chance
(chance=25%): (t=5.6, df=15, p<.001 one-tailed).
A two-way ANOVA for age and condition revealed main
effects of both age (F=14.6, df=1,30, p<.001) and condition
(F=31.9, df=1,30, <.001). Children's superior performance
on the gizmo condition makes it unlikely that they have a
general information-processing problem in keeping track of
the different consequences for two different objects of a
mechanism which operates over only one of them. Instead, it
supports the view that failure on the belief and camera
tasks has to do with the representational nature of beliefs
and photographs.
Experiment 4
In Experiment 3 the test questions asked in the gizmo
condition (where is object 1? where is object 2?) were not
ideal analogs to the test question asked in the camera
condition (which object is in location x?). The closest
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analog, presumably, would be: which object is at the bottom?
To rule out the possibility that the difference in questions
led to a difference in scores, we ran a new group of
subjects on the gizmo condition only.
In Experiment 4, each subject was given two trials,
each trial consisting of two questions:
Trial 1
Test questions: 1) Which toy is at the bottom?
2) Where is the (other toy)?
Trial 2
Test questions: 1) Which toy is at the top?
2) Where is the (other toy)?
Within trials, the order of questions remained the
same. However, the order of presentation of the trials was
counterbalanced.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 16 3-year-olds from local daycare centers
(mean age:3.6, range 3.0-4.0) with roughly equal numbers of
boys and girls.
Procedure
The new questions required the child to name objects,
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rather than simply to point at the top or bottom of the
tube. To make sure the child knew the names of all the
objects and understood that the 'game' required naming them
even when they were hidden, the following procedure was
added to the pretraining. The experimenter laid out the
objects on the table and asked the child to name them,
offering the information whenever needed; the experimenter
then picked up each object individually, hid it in her
closed fist, and asked the child which toy she was holding.
The pretraining then continued as in Experiment 3. The test
procedure was identical to that of Experiment 3 with the
exception of the new test questions.
Results and Discussion
Results are shown in Table 4 above. Subjects responded
correctly on 84% of the trials, compared with a chance rate
of 25% (t(15)=8.9, p<.001). A one-way ANOVA on trial type
('top' or 'bottom' series) showed no significant effect
(F(1,15)=3.5, <08).
Experiment 4 replicated the finding of Experiment 3
that children can keep track of the different consequences
for the two objects of a physical mechanism which operates
over only one of them.
Experiment 5
Perhaps the difference between the gizmo and
photo/belief conditions is that in the former, the child
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spontaneously draws the inferences as she goes along; that
is, the child already has a mental representation of the
location of the first object before the second object is put
into the gizmo machine. In the photo/belief condition, this
may not be so. Here the child might passively watch the
puppet shows, making no spontaneous inferences at all about
the contents of the photograph/belief. After the object has
changed location, the child is asked the test question, but
it is too late for the child to make the inference
correctly. Rather than recalling what the world was like at
the time that the belief/photo was formed and then making
the relevant inferences, the child simply defaults to a
strategy of reporting about the way the world is. The idea
here is that it might be crucial to make the inference early
on, at the time the belief/photo is formed; that is, having
a mental representation of the contents of the belief/photo
before any objects change location might help the child to
understand the subsequent changes, to see what is and what
is not relevant to the belief/photo.
This sort of effect has been seen before in the
placement of the 'ignorance' probe question (Wimmer &
Perner, 1983). When the ignorance question came directly
after the act of deception rather than at the end of the
skit, subjects scored higher on the belief question which
always appeared at the end of the skit. If this is correct,
we might ask what would happen if the child made the
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inference as to the contents of the belief/photo early on,
before the object changed location. Presumably the child
would correctly identify the object or actor at that point,
since there is no conflict between representation and
reality, so one could be certain that the child had formed a
correct mental representation of the contents of the photo.
What would then happen after the object's location was
changed, as in the original task, and the child was queried
again as to the contents of the belief/photo?
If children succeeded on this version of the task, then
one would have evidence that they know the belief is fixed
when the object is observed and that the photo is fixed when
it is taken. In this case the problem on the other versions
of the task would lie in the child's failure to draw the
inference spontaneously at the time of the original event.
Method
Belief Format
1. An actor sees object A in a box and then leaves.
2. Initial Query: Which [object] does A think is in the box?
3. In his absence, object A is removed from the box and
object B is placed in the box.
4. Second Query
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Photo Format
1. Actor A is photographed lying on a mat.
2. Initial Query: In this picture [holding it up, back
toward the subject], who is lying on the mat?
3. Actor A moves off the mat and Actor B lies down on it.
4. Second Query
There is an obvious pragmatic problem in the form of
the second query: if an experimenter asks a child the same
question twice, the child might feel that the first answer
must have been wrong -- that's why the experimenter is
asking again (Rose & Blank, 1974; Siegal, 1988). To avoid
this pragmatic problem, the second query did not involve
asking the same question again. Instead, a 'little game'
was introduced:
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Belief Skit 1
Onstage is an open box with a little bag of trash in it.
Mr. Dog: I wonder what's in this box -- oh, a bag of trash.
Yuch; that's stinky. I'm getting out of here;
I'll go for a walk.
Experimenter asks Initial Query: What does Mr. Dog think is
in the box? Experimenter then continues: Look, here comes
Oscar the Grouch with a bag of marbles.
Oscar: Wow!!! A bag of trash!!! I love trash; I'm tired of
these marbles. I'll just take this bag of trash
and leave my bag of marbles instead.
Experimenter: Remember Mr. Dog who looked in the box and
then left to take a walk? [Experimenter then
continues with Little Game.]
LITTLE GAME: Well, Carl [second experimenter] didn't see our
puppet show so he doesn't know which bag Mr. Dog
thinks is in the box. Let's play a little game;
I'll close my eyes and you give Carl the bag that
Mr. Dog thinks is in the box.
56
Camera Skit 1
Grover (G) and Bert (B) are outside in the sun. Bert is
lying on the mat and Grover is taking his picture. Big Bird
(BB) is off-stage.
G: OK, Bert, I can see you through the little window. Now
I'll just press this button. (Takes picture.) There,
that'll make a nice picture.
Experimenter (holding up the picture) asks Initial Query: In
this picture, who's lying on the mat? Experimenter then
continues: Bert is getting bored lying down.
B: Grover, I want to get up now and get a snack. (He gets
up and moves to side of stage.)
G: OK, good buddy. I'm going to get going now. Bye. (Takes
camera and leaves.)
Experimenter to Subject: Oh, look, here comes Big Bird.
BB: I think I'll lie down on this mat for a while and have a
rest.
Experimenter asks: Remember this picture? [Experimenter
then continues with Little Game.]
LITTLE GAME: In this picture (holding it up) there's a doll
lying on a mat. Carl didn't see our puppet show so he
doesn't know which doll it is. Let's play a game -- I'm
gonna close my eyes and you give Carl the doll that's lying
on the mat in this picture.
The motivation for having the experimenter close her
eyes was simply to make sure that the child didn't have to
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answer the same question twice to the same person. The
introduction of a second experimenter who hadn't seen the
puppet show served to motivate the child's second response,
while still ensuring that the child didn't have to give the
same person the two answers.
Belief skit 2 is identical to skit 1 except that it
involves different puppets, as well as the substitution of a
carrot and cookie for the bags of marbles and trash. Camera
skit 2 is identical to camera skit 1 except that it involves
different Sesame Street puppets and a bathtub instead of a
mat.
Subjects
Subjects included a group of 18 3-year-olds (mean age
3.7, range 3.1-3.10) and 20 4-year-olds (mean age 4.6, range
4.0-4.11) from local daycare centers, with roughly equal
numbers of boys and girls.
Procedure
The pretraining session with the camera was identical
to that of Experiment 3, but the test procedure was changed
in one respect: in Experiment 5, the camera was removed from
the scene before the actors changed location. This was done
to make sure that subjects weren't considering the camera to
be continuously operating on whatever it was pointing at.
Each subject had two trials on the belief condition and
two trials on the camera condition. Half the subjects had
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the belief skits first, while half had the camera skits
first.
Results and Discussion
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
Belief condition
As in Experiment 1, the 4-year olds succeeded in
attributing a false belief (t=3.9, df=20, p<.001). The 3-
year-olds, however, were worse than chance (t=2.4, df=18,
p<.05).
Camera condition
As in Experiment 3, the 4-year olds were not different
from chance in the camera condition (t=.52, df=20), while
the 3-year-olds were significantly worse than chance
(t=4.27, df=18, p<.001).
An ANOVA for effects of age, condition, and order of
presentation yielded significant main effects of age
[F(1,34)=20.6, p<.001] and question [F (1,34)=6.6, p<.015].
There was no interaction. Again, subjects were better in the
belief condition than the camera condition.
Clearly their earlier correct responses to the first
query did not help subjects make the inference again in the
'little game'. This attests to the robust nature of the
child's difficulty and rules out the hypothesis that the
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problem lay in the failure to spontaneously draw the
inferences early on.
General discussion
The results of the studies above replicate earlier
findings that right around their fourth birthday, children
acquire the ability to correctly attribute a false belief.
Further, they provide surprising evidence that the
preschooler has an even harder time reasoning about photos
than beliefs, at least the sort of reasoning demanded by our
task (Exps 1-3). This problem with photographs is very
robust; it doesn't disappear even when subjects are provided
with inferential assistance (Exps. 2 and 5). The hypothesis
that the problem with photographs is due to an inability to
track the various consequences for different objects of
different sorts of contact with the camera was not supported
by parallel experiments with a nonrepresentational machine,
the gizmo (Exps. 3 and 4). Nor is the problem caused by the
child's failure to make the inference at the time the
photograph is taken (Exp. 5).
Implications for the false belief task
These results bear on the interpretation of the false
belief task, particularly the 'copytheory' account outlined
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at the beginning of this paper. Recall that the copytheory
view was proposed to explain the child's inability to
consider conflicting beliefs, but clearly no claims about
the child's theory of mind will explain the failure on the
camera task. The camera studies suggest that the failure to
correctly attribute a false representation may be more
widespread than anyone thought--that is, the problem goes
beyond mental representations, at least, it would seem, to
pictorial representations. The results therefore suggest
that mental representations may be hard not because they're
mental but because they're representations. If this is
true, then failure on the false belief task may have little
to do with the fact that children lack an active cognitivist
conception of the mind. (After all, the camera studies
require no such understanding of the camera; to view the
camera as a once and for all copymaker would be to succeed
on the camera task.)
Indeed, there is reason to think that a copytheorist
(on at least some version of the copytheory) would do just
fine on the false belief task. Consider the copytheorist who
knows nothing of perception and considers the mind to be
just a bucket into which copies of events are dumped.
Suppose this copytheorist knows one thing: she knows that
you have to be correctly situated in space and time to get
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hit with the information (Chandler & Boyes, 1982). This
copytheorist should succeed on the false belief task,
because this child knows the only facts you need to know:
that if you are in the right place at the right time you
will get the copy of the way the world is; if you aren't you
won't. In the false belief task, the deceived actor is
'hit' with the information that the object is in location x;
he therefore has a 'copy' of this event in his 'bucket'. He
is never 'hit' with the information that the object has been
moved to location y, so no copy of that event is acquired.
Now when the child (the copytheorist) is asked what the
deceived actor believes, he should correctly respond
'location x', since that's the event which the deceived
actor has a copy of in his bucket. In other words, so long
as this child can remember who was where when, he will
succeed on this task. The point is that an active model of
the mind as an internal processor is not needed to succeed
on this task.
The claim that the child is a copytheorist can only
explain the child's failure to correctly attribute a false
belief when the false belief was caused by some internal
processing problem, something the child would need to
postulate an internal process for. It's very good then at
explaining the child's problem in the appearance-reality
task investigated by Flavell and his collaborators (1988).
Here the child is faced with an object which looks like a
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rock but feels like a sponge. The copytheorist-child has a
dilemma here, since he has two conflicting 'copies' of the
object being dumped into his 'bucket'. Since the
copytheorist-child does not posit any perceptual processes,
there is simply no way in which two copies of the same
object could conflict. For the same reason, the claim that
the child is a copytheorist is very good at explaining the
child's problems in understanding individual differences,
since the source of such differences is within the different
minds. But it cannot explain problems representing false
beliefs which have been caused by changes in the world.
Flavell has claimed that the young child doesn't really
understand that seeing, hearing, feeling, and the like yield
representations (1988). It's quite plausible that the
mental representations engendered as a consequence of our
experiences in the world are difficult for the child to
understand. Perception, after all, is a complicated
process; it does not occur in a discrete moment and it
rarely calls attention to itself. The representations it
engenders, beliefs, are immaterial and abstract. In the
case of the photograph, however, it's hard to see the same
argument being made; in this condition, the process of
fixing the representation, focussing on an object and
pushing the button, has none of the complexity of
perception. Unlike the mind, the operation of the camera is
behaviorally salient and temporally discrete. Furthermore,
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the representations themselves, the photographs, can be seen
and handled; indeed, in our pretraining period, each child
sees, holds, and discusses the picture he or she took. From
their reactions, it is clear that the children notice that
it is a picture of the puppet.
Consider the photographs themselves; none of the
properties of beliefs which have been taken to cause the
child's problems apply to the photos. Photos are not
immaterial, they are not intangible, they are not private
and internal; in short, with the photos, children are faced
with none of the problems in bridging the material and
immaterial realms which, Leslie claims, lead to their
failure with beliefs. Nevertheless, they fail.
The Camera Task
What is the source of the problem on the camera task,
then? The first explanation that comes to mind is that the
children don't know much about the mechanism of cameras, so
they cannot possibly succeed on the task. We would argue,
however, that there is probably nothing much they would have
to know about the camera to get this task right except for
what they probably know already and what our pretraining
teaches them -- that is, that you aim the camera at the
object, look through the window and push the button.
Furthermore, it seems implausible that the difference
between the children who succeed and the children who fail
is that the former know something of the inner workings of
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the camera. Children don't really have to know more about
cameras to succeed on this task; what they do have to know
about is photographs.
Specifically, what they have to know is that 1) the
photo is a representation of whatever was in front of the
little window when the photo was taken and 2) that it
captures a moment in space and time and doesn't change after
that. If the child kept that in mind, he could infer the
correct answer so long as 3) he remembered how the world was
when the picture was taken. We think it's reasonable to
assume that subjects understand #1, that the photo will
represent whatever was in front of the little window when
the button was pushed; after all, we have explicitly told
them just that in the pretraining and in fact each subject
looked through the little window, pushed the button and then
watched the image develop. Furthermore, it's clear from
their correct responses to the probe questions in Experiment
2 that subjects have no problem with #3; they do remember
the way the world was when the picture was taken.
Apparently they don't use that information in reasoning
about the photo's contents in our task.
One possible explanation for this is that the child has
a problem with #2, the analysis of the temporal properties
of photographs; in short, the child thinks photographs
update, changing along with changes in the world. This view
could be less wild than it seems at first blush. After all,
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different sorts of representations differ in their
fixedness. Photographs are spatiotemporally fixed, but other
representations are not; mirrors and closed-circuit
television, for instance, yield representations that do in
fact change along with changes in the world. In the absence
of specific knowledge to the contrary, the child might
consider the photo to be dynamic.
A related possibility is that the child has no analysis
by which photos can update; she simply has no analysis at
all. It might be argued that this would lead to random
responses, not systematically wrong ones, but the
systematically wrong responding could be explained as the
child's adopting some strategy (of reporting on the world)
in her state of confusion.
These explanations locate the failure in the child's
missing knowledge. If we consider how complicated the adult
understanding of representation is, it is no surprise that
learning about representations is a gradual process. In
addition to the differences in ontological status and in
fixedness mentioned above, there are many other properties
which vary across different types of representations. To
name just a few, there are the spatial properties --
pictures are 2-dimensional, sculpture is 3-dimensional,
beliefs and words are nondimensional; there's the
naturalness or conventionality of the representation --
words represent in virtue of convention while mirrors and
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photos do not; there's the access of the representation --
beliefs are private, whereas photos and mirror reflections
are public; finally, there's the directness of the cause --
in photos and mirrors, the input which determines the nature
of the representation is in fact what the representation
represents; not so for beliefs -- I can think about things
that are not only not currently present, but things that
don't even exist.
It could take quite a while to work all this out. It
seems possible then that in the absence of a general theory
of representation, of a single domain with causal principles
which apply to all its members, the child must learn in a
piecemeal fashion, one sort of representation at a time.
Development, then, would consist in straightforward
knowledge acquisition.
I would like to suggest, however, an entirely different
explanation of the photograph results: that the child
actually has the correct analysis of the temporal properties
of photographic representations, but she does not or cannot
use this knowledge in the case where the photo conflicts
with the true state of affairs. In this case the child's
reasoning collapses. In a similar vein, Perner, Leekam, and
Wimmer (1987) have described the child's problem with
beliefs as the inability to assign conflicting truth values
to a single proposition. This ability is crucial in the
false belief task where the child must represent both his
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own knowledge of the world [THE OBJECT IS IN LOCATION X, NOT
IN LOCATION Y] and the deceived actor's false belief [THE
OBJECT IS IN LOCATION Y]. If the child takes the photograph
to be making a claim about the world, she is faced with the
same problem here: the photograph is at odds with the
child's current perceptual representation of the world. The
photograph assigns truth to a claim which the child's own
perceptual representation denies. On this view, the young
child's failure on the camera task suggests that the
difficulty in assigning conflicting truth values to a
proposition about the world is not specific to mental
representations.
What kind of conceptual problem underlies this
difficulty in assigning conflicting truth values? An
interesting piece of the puzzle is that 3-year olds are
successful at pretend play (Leslie, 1987) and at
distinguishing between real and imaginary objects (Wellman &
Estes, 1986). It is with representations which are supposed
to reliably describe the actual world that children seem to
run into trouble. This suggests that it is the assumption
of veridicality of certain sorts of representations (among
them beliefs and photographs) that is the problem. With
respect to beliefs, this point has been made before and is,
in fact, a central claim of the copytheory account. It is
plausible that the same assumption of veridicality underlies
the children's performance on the camera studies.
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If children do assume that beliefs are veridical, then
reasoning about them may be hard not, as Leslie claims,
because they remain outside the causal fabric of the world;
rather, they are hard because they are well within it --
they are seen to be determined by events in the world and as
such, the child takes them to be veridical.
This does not mean, of course, that the ability to
consider misrepresentation is an all-or-none competence.
One might speculate, for instance, that children would have
a somewhat easier time conceiving of a false drawing of a
state of affairs than a false photograph, just in case they
are sensitive to the directly-caused nature of photographs.
There is evidence that 6-year-olds, at least, appreciate
this special status of photographs. O'Connor, Beilin, and
Kose (1981) presented children with either photographs or
drawings of an incorrect solution to a conservation of
liquid task. They found that subjects were more likely to
choose the illogical outcome as the true outcome when it was
represented in a photograph than in a drawing. The authors
have argued from these results that children believe in the
fidelity of photographs. Although children might perform
better on a 'false' representation task using drawings, it
still makes sense that they should have some difficulty;
that is, to the extent that children understood the drawing
to have captured a state of affairs in the world, it is
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likely that they would take it to have some claim to the
truth.
My claim, then, is that the child has all the causal
knowledge she needs to determine the contents of a
photograph; she understands that the picture will be of
whoever was in front of the window when the button was
pressed, and she has no mistaken ideas that the photo is a
dynamic representation. The claim here is that this
knowledge is either not accessed in our task or that the
correct inference that it leads to is rejected because it
conflicts with the child's own perceptual representation of
the real state of affairs. Notice that this claim predicts
that the child might reason very well about the contents of
photographs so long as the conflict with reality is
eliminated or possibly just sufficiently minimized.
There are several ways one might do this. For
instance, if one asked "Who's in the picture?" rather than
"Who's lying on the mat in the picture?", the child might
succeed. That's just because the test question does not
confront the child with the conflicting propositions 'X IS
LYING ON THE MAT' and Y (AND NOT X) IS LYING ON THE MAT'.
In the absence of this conflict, the child could use the
knowledge he has about how the content of the photograph is
determined -- and come to the right answer. Notice that
success on this task is clearly not predicted by the
alternative claim, considered above, that the child thinks
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the photo is dynamic. This claim predicts failure on this
task as well. The second alternative discussed above, that
the child has no analysis of the temporal properties of
photographs, is somewhat harder to make predictions from.
Clearly, it would be consistent with this claim for the
child to respond randomly. However, it is also possible
that the child would answer correctly on the basis of her
understanding that the photo is initially a picture of
whoever was in front of the window when the button was
snapped. That is, even without explicit knowledge that the
photo is fixed, the child might choose the right actor
simply because in this case, where the child is not faced
with conflicting representations of who is on the mat, the
actor who was in front of the camera when the button was
pushed has a stronger claim than the other actors.
If children do in fact make an assumption of
veridicality of beliefs and photos, how is it overcome? The
most plausible story, and the one supported by the present
findings, is that it doesn't happen all at once. The 4-
year-olds, who are succeeding on the false belief task, are
still failing the camera task. It's likely then that the
veridicality assumption has to be discovered to be false for
each type of representation independently. And how is this
discovery made? Presumably, the inferences it supports will
fail; the child will acquire sufficient counterevidence to
cause the collapse of the assumption. Now we can see why
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the child should succeed on the belief task before the
camera task. Given the central importance of beliefs in the
child's everyday predictions of behavior (and perhaps given
the sheer volume of such inferences as compared to
inferences about photographs), the consequences of his false
belief about beliefs are likely to be more costly than those
of his false belief about photographs. The counterevidence,
then, will have a greater claim to the child's attention.
The mechanism of development, on this view too, is domain-
specific knowledge acquisition.
In any case, the present studies suggest that the
child's problem with false belief should be seen in a
broader context. To explain the results of the camera
studies as well as the belief studies, we may need to cast a
larger net.
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Appendix
Experiment 1
Belief Skit 2
On stage are a bed, a grocery cabinet, groceries, a cookie
jar, and a box of cookies. Two Sesame Street puppets, Bert
(B) and Oscar the Grouch (OG) appear.
B: Hey, Oscar. Could you help me put the groceries into the
cabinet?
OG: Sure, Bert.
[The puppets put various grocery items into the cabinet.]
OG: (picking up the box of cookies) Where should I put the
cookies, Bert?
B: Put them in the cookie jar. Don't eat them! Just put
them in the cookie jar.
OG: (regretfully) Okay.
B: Say, Oscar. Why don't you stay for dinner? Go put your
coat away in the foyer.
[OG leaves the room].
B: (to Subject) If I leave those cookies in the cookie jar,
Oscar will eat them all up. Hmmm. I know! I'll move
the cookies from the cookie jar to underneath the bed.
[He moves the cookies]. There. Now the cookies are
safe and sound underneath the bed.
Ignorance Probe Question: Does Oscar the Grouch know where
the cookies are now?
[OG comes back into the room.]
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B: Oscar, you wait here; I'm going to get some tea in the
other room.
[B leaves the room.]
OG: Now I'll eat those cookies!
Test Question: Where does Oscar think the cookies are?
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Table 1
Experiment 1
Frequency of subjects getting neither (0%), one (50%), or
both (100%) trials right, by condition.
Belief
0% 50% 100% Mean
5 3 6 54
1 2 15 89
Camera
0% 50% 100% Mean
6 3 5 46
5 2 11 67
2 1 11 82
N
3s 14
4s 18
5s 14
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Table 2
Experiment 2
Frequency of subjects getting neither (0%), one (50%), or
both (100%) trials right, by condition.
Belief Camera
N 0% 50% 100% Mean 0% 50% 100% Mean
4s 26 1 1 24 94 5 5 16 72
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FIGURE 1: "GIZMO"'
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Table 3
Experiment 3
Camera Condition
N 0% 50% 100% Mean
16 10 4 2 25
16 4 4 8
3s
4/5s 63
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Table 4
Experiments 3 and 4
Gizmo Condition
Frequency of subjects getting neither (0%), one (25%), two
(50%), three (75%) or four (100%) questions right in the
gizmo condition.
Age
Exp. 3
Exp. 3
Exp. 4
3s
4s
3s
N 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Mean
16 1 1 5 2 7 70
16 0 0 0 0 16 100
16 1 0 3 0 12 84
79
Table 5
Experisent 5
Belief
0% 50% 100% Mean
3s 9 7 2 30
4s 2 4 14 80
Camera
0% 50% 100% Mean
12 5 1 19
6 6 8 55
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Is Only Seeing Really Believing?: Sources of the true
belief in the false belief task
The last decade has seen a surge of interest in the
young child's developing understanding of mental states such
as beliefs and desires. This interest is motivated by the
realization that our everyday theory of human action rests
on some understanding of such mental states; that is, when
we want to predict or explain Mary's behavior, we appeal to
her beliefs and desires. Indeed, some understanding of
human intentionality seems crucial to the growth of social
cognition in general. For these reasons, a theory of mind
seems a likely candidate for a universal competence and,
according to Fodor (1987), an innate competence.
This claim is in striking contrast to the view espoused
by Piaget (1929) that the child does not even differentiate
the physical and mental realms until around age 7. Piaget's
view, however, has undergone a strong attack. For instance,
Wellman and Estes (1986) have found that even 3-year-olds
clearly distinguish the mental from the physical along the
same intuitive criteria that adults use: they understand
that physical entities, but not mental entities, are
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tangible, public, and continuous from one moment to the
next.
Dennett (1978) has suggested that strong evidence that
a child has a theory of mind would come from success on a
task of the following format:
1) Child believes that Actor believes that p.
2) Child believes that Actor desires that q.
3) Child infers from his beliefs in (1) and (2) that
Actor will therefore do x.
Wimmer & Perner (1983) adapted Dennett's paradigm to
develop what has become a litmus test for the 'theory of
mind' literature, the 'false belief' task. In this task,
children are given stories with the following format:
1. Actor A sees an object in location x.
2. In his absence, the object is moved to location y.
Test Question: Where will Actor A look for the object?
It is important that the Actor's belief is false; otherwise,
the child might succeed on the task even without an
understanding of mental states, simply by pointing to the
object's actual location.
In a series of studies Wimmer and Perner tested 3-, 4-,
and 5-year-olds on stories with the format above. They
found that 4-years-old correctly pointed to location x,
explaining that the actor would look there because that's
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where he saw it. Most 3-year-olds, however, claimed that
the actor would look in location y, because 'that's where it
is'. This finding has been replicated many times with many
interesting variations in the task (Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner
(1986); Perner, Leekam,& Wimmer (1987); Gopnik & Astington,
1988). For instance, Hogrefe et al. maximized the salience
of the false belief in the following way: they presented
subjects with a box of Smarties, a popular brand of candy in
England, and asked subjects what they thought was inside.
All subjects responded that they thought it was Smarties (or
candy). Subjects were then shown that the box contained
only a pencil. The box was closed again. Subjects were then
told that another child would soon be brought into the room.
They were asked what this other child would think was in the
box when he or she first looked at it all closed up.
Subjects responded, "a pencil". Even though they themselves
had just been tricked with the same candy box, they
nevertheless failed to attribute the same false belief to
another child.
In another variation on the Smarties task (Gopnik &
Astington, 1988), subjects were asked what they thought was
in the closed candy box, then shown its contents. Instead
of being asked what someone else would think was in the
closed box, they were asked what they themselves had thought
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was in the box before they opened it. Remarkably, subjects
claimed that they thought all along that there was a pencil
in the box! In sum, the 3-year-old's difficulty with false
beliefs is a robust finding.
The question arises, however, whether the false belief
task may not provide too conservative a measure of
children's understanding of beliefs and their causal role in
behavior: It could be that children would successully
attribute beliefs and predict behavior in a task which
maintained Dennett's format, above, so long as the task did
not involve false beliefs. Of course one would have to
control for the possibility mentioned above that the child
might succeed simply by pointing to the object's actual
location.
In a series of studies, Wellman and Bartsch (1988)
attempted to do just this. They presented children with
information about a protagonist's belief and desire and then
asked subjects to predict the protagonist's action. Even 3-
year-olds were successful on this task. To ensure that this
success was not due to the subject's own belief consistently
coinciding with the protagonist's belief, subjects were also
presented with the 'not-own' control condition:
"Sam wants to find his puppy. His puppy might be
hiding in the garage or under the porch. Where do you
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think Sam's puppy is? [Here the child answered with,
let's say, 'under the porch'.] But Sam thinks his puppy
is in the garage. Where will Sam look?"
Even the 3-year-olds were 84% correct in this condition.
This condition, however, does not provide the necessary
control for the strategy mentioned above, that the child
might just take information about where Sam thinks his puppy
is to be information about where the puppy really is, or
where anyone would look for the puppy. Recently, however,
Leekam and Perner (1988) have rerun the 'Not-Own' condition,
adding the necessary control question: "Where would YOU look
for the puppy?" Subjects correctly answered that they would
look 'under the porch' whereas Sam would look 'in the
garage'.
In another condition, the Inferred-belief control
condition, subjects were presented with stories like the
following:
"There are magic markers in the desk and there are
magic markers on the shelf. This morning Fred saw the
magic markers in the desk, but he did not see the magic
markers on the shelf. Now Fred wants magic markers.
Where will he look?"
The authors argued that if children used the strategy of
responding with the object's true location, subjects should
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answer randomly, since the magic markers are truly in both
locations. This, however, did not happen. Instead, subjects
succeeded in constraining the puppet's behavior to his
perceptual experience.
In another task, the 'discrepant belief' task, the
child was shown drawings of a cupboard and a refrigerator
with paper-flap doors. The child was told "Look, there are
bananas in the cupboard and there are bananas in the
refrigerator." Both flaps were then shut and the child was
shown a picture of a story character and told, "This is Jan.
Jan wants a banana. Jan thinks there are only bananas in the
cupboard; she doesn't think there are bananas in the
refrigerator. Where will Jan look for a banana?" Once
again, a strategy of reporting the object's true location
should lead to random responding. Instead, subjects were
overwhelmingly correct in this task.
The work of Wellman and his colleagues, then, seems to
show that 3-year-old children have a theory of mind in the
following important senses:
1) They see the role of perceptual experience in belief
formation (inferred-belief-control task).
2) They understand that people can hold conflicting
beliefs (not-own task).
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3) They appreciate that people's behavior is
predictable from their beliefs (discrepant-beliefs
and not-own task).
4) They understand the ontological differences between
mental entities and material entities; that is, they
take mental entities but not material entities to be
private, internal, intangible, and impermanent
(Wellman & Estes, 1986).
Given all this knowledge about the mind, the robust
failure of 3-year-olds on the false belief task is very
mysterious. One thing, however, seems clear: the child's
problem is not an inability to attribute beliefs, but an
inability to attribute false beliefs. Now it might be
objected that both the Discrepant and the Inferred-belief
tasks involve the attribution of a false belief. Still,
there does seem to be a difference between the standard
false belief tasks and these tasks: in the Discrepant and
Inferred-Belief tasks the actor's belief (that the object is
in location x) is actually true. It is an incomplete
representation of reality, of course -- it captures only
part of the truth. Still, it is true as far as it goes.
What, then, is the source of the child's difficulty on
the standard false belief tasks? The present study
considers three hypotheses.
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Hypothesis 1:
Children cannot imagine that perceptual experience, an
extremely reliable source of information, could lead an
actor to a false belief. In fact, children in the false
belief task might reason like this: the actor has seen the
cookies in location x, so he knows where they are. Later,
when asked "where does the actor think the cookies are?",
the child recalls that the actor knows where they are; the
child then points to the cookies' current location.
Essentially, this would be to claim that the child
translates information about seeing into information about
knowing. There is some evidence that children do confuse
seeing with knowing in certain cases. Taylor (1988)
presented children with three pictures, each of which had a
drawing of two animals. After showing the subject a picture
of a giraffe sitting down next to an elephant, for instance,
she covered the picture with a piece of cardboard which had
a small open window such that only a tiny uninformative
piece of the drawing beneath it was visible. She then asked
subjects whether another child, who had not seen the full
drawing and who could see only the tiny part that was
visible through the window, would know that there was an
elephant in the drawing. Her results were surprising: a
large number of 4-year-olds and even 5-year-olds assumed
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that seeing any part of the drawing, no matter how
uninformative adults would consider it (even just an edge of
a line), would lead to knowledge on the part of the viewer.
Although 3-year-olds on Taylor's task showed no systematic
response pattern at all, it could be that her task was so
difficult in some other respect that it masked the same
'seeing is knowing' assumption among 3-year-olds.
If Hypothesis 1 is right, then the child's problem in
inferring false beliefs is specific to visually acquired
false beliefs. If children, like adults, consider verbal
reports less trustworthy than visual experience, they might
succeed in attributing a false belief which was acquired by
testimony. To reiterate, the child might think that 'seeing
that x is knowing x' but not that 'being told that x is
knowing x'.
This hypothesis can account for the pattern of
successes and failures discussed above. In the standard
false belief tasks, the deceived actor's belief is acquired
by seeing the object in question (even in the Smarties task,
the deceived actor will be brought into the room to see the
box). On all these tasks the child fails. Conversely, all
but one of the Wellman & Bartsch tasks on which the child
succeeds avoid this problem all together; with the exception
of the Inferred-belief task, the child doesn't infer the
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actor's belief from information about what the actor has
seen. Instead, the child is explicity told the actor's
belief. In the Inferred-belief task, of course, the child
does make the inference from what the actor saw to what he
thinks, but in this case the inference leads to the correct
response: 1) Sam saw the set of markers that were in the
desk; 2) therefore Sam knows the location of those markers;
3) therefore Sam will look for those markers where they are
-- in the desk.
Hypothesis 2:
The difficulty in the standard paradigm is that the
false belief was once true. Changing the truth status of
the representation may be hard for the young child. If this
is so, then young children might successfully attribute a
false belief which has been stipulated as false from the
beginning. Consider that all the false belief tasks
described above require changing the status of a proposition
from true to false while none of the tasks on which they
succeed requires this (since none of these involves false
beliefs). As remarked above, the actor's beliefs in the
Discrepant and Inferred-Belief tasks are probably
represented as true, if incomplete, rather than as false.
Hypothesis 3:
It does not matter whether the deceived actor's false
belief was generated by visual experience or testimony, but
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it may well matter how the subject's true belief was
generated. The claim is that the child is unable to
attribute a belief which conflicts with his or her own
visually acquired true belief, because these sorts of
beliefs are marked as certain; in the case where the child
is certain of the object's true location, he or she will not
attribute to anyone else a belief that the object is
somewhere else. In the standard false belief task, the child
sees the object in its actual location and is therefore
certain it is there. Hypothesis 3 predicts that the child
will perform better when his or her true belief has been
acquired by a less reliable source of information--by
testimony-- and is therefore less certain.
This was suggested by an early finding of Johnson and
Maratsos (1977). They too presented subjects with stories
where one actor deceives another actor by lying about the
location of a hidden object. Half the subjects saw (while
the other half were only told) the object's true location
before the deceiving actor tells the lie. Subjects were
then asked where the deceived actor would look for the
object. If Subjects answered incorrectly, the skit was
repeated, reemphasizing the main events. [This was done
because correct responses to this question were criterial to
going on to the main test questions which were the real aim
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of this study.] Table 1 below shows the results for 3- and
4-year-olds in both the 'told' and 'shown' conditions. The
table provides scores tabulated in two ways -- after an
initial hearing of the story (T1) and after either an
initial hearing or after retelling (T1 or T2).
TABLE 1
Johnson and Maratsos (1977)
NUMBER OF TRIALS
Group N 1 1 or 2
3s
Told 9 .53 .86
Shown 7 .29 .39
4s
Told 9 .78 .92
Shown 7 .82 .93
As usual, there is improvement with age and 4-year-olds
as a group succeed in attributing a false belief. More
interesting, however, is the difference in 3-year-olds'
scores between conditions. In the T1 tabulation, 3-year-olds
performed better in the 'told' condition than in the 'shown'
condition. In the T1 or T2 tabulation, this difference is
even more marked. As Johnson and Maratsos pointed out,
children in the 'told' condition were likely to improve with
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the second telling of the story, while children in the
'shown' condition were likely to repeat their incorrect
response.
Hypothesis 3, too, is compatible with the experimental
results discussed above. In the standard false belief tasks,
the child sees the object in its actual location and is
therefore certain of the true state of affairs; in this
case, the child cannot attribute a belief which conflicts
with what he or she has seen. In the one Wellman & Bartsch
task in which the child actually sees bananas in both
locations, the child is able to ignore his or her own visual
experience and correctly predict where the actor will look
for a banana. But in this condition, as mentioned above,
the actor's explicitly stated belief does not deny what the
child has seen; it only partially captures it.
Notice that the Johnson and Maratsos results not only
provide support for Hypothesis 3; they also provide
counterevidence to Hypotheses 1 and 2. That is, in their
seen condition, the false belief was not visually acquired,
nor was it once true; still, children failed the task.
While these findings are suggestive, they need replicating.
For one thing, as mentioned, they were not the main findings
of the study; they were merely the results of a preliminary
task where correct responding was criterial to going on to
93
the real test questions. As such, they were not reported in
great detail or with a full statistical analysis.
Furthermore, there is some counterevidence to Hypothesis 3
as well. In addition to the tasks described above, Wellman
and Bartsch presented preschoolers with an Explicit False
Belief condition. Here children were told that the object
was really in location x, but that the actor thought it was
in location y. Children were then asked where the actor
would look for the object and where it really was. Three-
year-olds were worse than chance on this task (16% correct)
while even 4-year-olds were not better than chance (31%
correct). These data suggest that having the actor's true
belief stem from testimony rather than visual experience may
be a necessary but not sufficient condition for success.
It seems clear that, given the conflicting sources of
evidence, a direct comparison of the 'seen', 'told', and
standard false belief task is needed to decide among
Hypotheses 1,2, and 3. Furthermore, since the Johnson &
Maratsos task is the first in which a majority of 3-year-
olds succeed in attributing a false belief, it is worth
replicating children's success in the 'told' condition. The
present experiment was designed to address these needs.
All three hypotheses were tested in the present study.
Consider the three formats below.
94
Format of standard version:
1. Actor A sees object in location x.
2. In his absence, Actor B moves object to location y.
3. Test Question: Where does Actor A think it is?
Format of unseen testimony version:
1. Actor B tells Subject that object is in location y
but that he will tell Actor A that it is in location
x.
2. B tells A it's in location x.
3. Test Question: Where does Actor A think it is?
Format of seen testimony version:
1. Actor B tells and shows Subject that object is in
location y but that he will tell Actor A that it is
in location x.
2. B tells A it's in location x.
3. Test Question: Where does Actor A think it is?
Based on the previous literature (Johnson and Maratsos,
1977; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), it is expected that all groups
of 4-year-olds will succeed on the task. As for 3-year-olds,
the predictions which follow from our three hypotheses are
as follows:
1) If Hypothesis 1 is true, then subjects in both the
seen and unseen testimony conditions should succeed on the
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task, because Actor A's false belief was generated by
testimony, not visual experience. Subjects in the standard
condition, however, will fail.
2) Similarly, if Hypothesis 2 is correct, 3-year-olds
in both testimony conditions should succeed because the
false belief never was a true belief. Rather, the claim
that the hidden object was in location x was stipulated as
false from the beginning. Subjects in the standard
condition, however, will fail. Clearly, if our youngest
subjects in both testimony conditions performed well, while
3-year-olds in the standard version did not, we would need
an additional experiment to determine which factor was
responsible for their success. This would be easily done by
having a testimony version where the false belief was once
true, as in the standard task.
3) If Hypothesis 3 is correct, then 3-year-olds in the
unseen testimony version should succeed while subjects in
the seen testimony and the standard version will fail,
because only the subjects in the unseen testimony condition
will not suffer from having seen the object's true location.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 96 preschoolers from the Boston area, 48
3-year-olds (2.11-3.11, mean 3.6) and 48 4-year-olds (4.0-
5.3, mean 4.6). Subjects in each age group were equally
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divided among three conditions: the standard belief
condition, the 'seen' testimony version and the 'unseen'
testimony version.
Procedure
Stories were presented to subjects in the form of
puppet skits. (See sample skit of each condition below; for
second skit of each condition, see Appendices A and B.)
Each subject was individually presented with two trials
within a single condition. Following each skit, the subject
was asked the four questions, as shown below.
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Sample skit for standard condition
Big Bird (BB): I just got a new toy airplane. I love to play
with my toy airplane. It's here in my toybox. Wanna
see it?
Frog: Yeah.
BB: Here it is (he shows Frog the airplane in the box.)
Frog: That's nice, Big Bird. Well, I have to go home now to
eat lunch, but I'm going to come back later, after
lunch, to play with your new toy airplane. Bye.
(Frog leaves)
BB: Hmm... when Frog comes back, he'll want to play with my
airplane. But I'll want to play with it; I don't want
him to play with it. I know; I'll hide the airplane.
Frog saw the airplane here in the toybox but I'll hide
it here in the closet.
(BB hides the plane in the closet.)
Experimenter: Frog is at home now eating his lunch. Before,
when Frog was here with Big Bird, he saw the airplane
in the toybox.
Reality Control Q: Well, where is the airplane now?
Deceived Actor's Ignorance Q: Does Frog know that?
Deceived Actor's Belief Q: Where does he think it is?
Deceiving Actor's Knowledge Q: How about Big Bird? Does he
know the toy airplane is in the closet?
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Sample skit for testimony conditions
Big Bird (BB): I jut got a new toy airplane. I love to play
with my toy airplane. Frog is coming over soon to play with
me. If he finds out that I got a new toy airplane, he'll
want to play with it. But I want to play with it. My toy
airplane is here in my toybox (in seen condition, child is
shown the toy airplane in the toybox) but I won't tell Frog
that. I'll make something up. I'll tell him that my toy
airplane is in my closet. Yeah, that's what I'll say.
Really my toy airplane is in my toybox, but I'll tell Frog
that it's in my closet.
Frog: Hi, Big Bird! Can I play with your toy airplane?
BB: Yeah... it's in my closet.
Frog: Oh, thanks for telling me.
Experimenter: Big Bird told Frog that his toy airplane is in
the closet.
Reality Q: Where is the toy airplane really?
Deceived Actor's Ignorance Q: Does Frog know that?
Deceived Actor's Belief Q: Where does Frog think it is?
Deceiving Actor's Knowledge Q: Does Big Bird know that the
toy airplane is in the toybox?
The Questions. The reality control question served to
ensure that correct answers to the belief question were
meaningful. The deceived actor's ignorance question was
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included as a probe because it had been claimed to help the
child make the inference about the false belief (Hogrefe,
Wimmer, & Perner, 1986). Since the same authors have also
claimed that the ability to attribute ignorance appears
earlier than the ability to attribute false belief (that's
why it's helpful in answering the latter question), it is
hard to see any straightforward predictions of Hypotheses 1-
3 with respect to the ignorance probe question. If ignorance
attribution is indeed easier and earlier than false belief
attribution, it could be the case that children who fail the
false belief question will nevertheless succeed on the
ignorance question. What would be expected, however, is
that children who succeed on the test question, the belief
question, will also succeed on the ignorance question.
Following the ignorance question came the test question
itself: the false belief question. This question, of course,
is crucial, since it is this question that directly taps the
ability to attribute a false belief. Finally, the child was
queried about the knowledge of the deceiving actor. This
question is less central than the ignorance question since
it is quite possible that subjects in this task are not
really tracking the deceiver's epistemic state. Still, the
question was included to have some measure of how robust an
understanding subjects had that the deceived actor was
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ignorant, while the deceiver was knowledgeable, about the
object's location.
Results
All answers to the reality control question were
correct.
The deceived actor's belief question
Table 2 shows the percentages of correct reponses to
the test question by age and condition. As predicted, 4-
year-olds performed better than 3-year-olds: F(1,90)=14.9,
p<.01. The older subjects were better than chance (chance =
50%) in the unseen testimony condition t(15)=5.7, p<.001
one-tailed), the seen testimony condition {t(15)=2.23,
p<.025 one-tailed) and the standard condition (t(15)=7.0,
p<.001 one-tailed).
As for the 3-year-olds, only subjects in the unseen
condition were better than chance: t(15)=2.15, p<.025 one-
tailed. These 3-year-olds were also better than 3-year-olds
in the seen condition {t(30)=1.87, p<.05 one-tailed) and the
standard condition {t(30)=1.79, p<.05, one-tailed).
Table 3 shows the distribution of scores by condition
for the 3-year-olds. Notice that subjects in the two chance
groups were not just guessing; scores were bimodally
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distributed. For the most part, subjects were either
systematically right or systematically wrong. A contingency
test over the two trials revealed a C=.36, chi
square(df=l)=17.8, p<.001, two-tailed.
Two contrast analyses were computed, one to test
Hypotheses 1 and 2, and the other to test Hypothesis 3. In
the first contrast, the prediction is that 3-year-olds will
do better in both the seen and unseen conditions than they
will in the standard condition, so lambda weights were
assigned as follows: 3's in the unseen and seen conditions,
+1; 3's in the standard condition, -2; all 4's, 0. This
contrast analysis failed to reach significance (F(1,90)=1.3,
p >.2, two-tailed.)
The second contrast analysis tests the prediction that
3-year-olds will do better in the unseen condition than in
either the seen or standard condition. Lambda weights were
assigned as follows: +2 to the 3's in the unseen condition,
-1 to the 3's in both the seen and standard conditions, and
0 to all the groups of 4-year-olds. This contrast proved
significant (F(1,90)=5.36, p<.025, two-tailed.}
The Ignorance and Knowledge Questions
4-year-olds
In every condition the older preschoolers were correct
in claiming that the deceived puppet was ignorant (ignorance
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question) while the deceiving puppet was knowledgeable
(knowledge question; see Table 4). Correct responses to
these questions support the claim that the older subjects
succeeded in attributing a false belief for the right
reason, because they understood the central deception of the
plot.
3-year-olds
The Ignorance Question: Only subjects in the unseen
condition performed better than chance on the ignorance
question (see Table 5). Of the 10 subjects in this
condition who were consistently right on the false belief
questions, all were consistently right on the ignorance
questions as well.
The Knowledge Question: Only subjects in the standard
condition were better than chance on the knowledge question.
Presumably, the fact that the puppet actually hid the object
in this condition led children to infer his knowledge --
even those children who failed the false belief question
itself (see Table 6).
The Unseen condition:
Although subjects in the unseen condition were not, as
a group, better than chance, they were not simply guessing.
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Again scores were bimodally distributed, with 11 subjects
(69%) consistently right and 5 subjects (31%) consistently
wrong (see Table 6).
The odds of getting both the ignorance and knowledge
questions right on both trials simply by guessing is only 6%
(.5x.5x.5x.5=.0625), yet 50% of the subjects in the unseen
condition showed this pattern of results. Furthermore, every
one of these children was consistently correct on the false
belief question as well. The chance of responding correctly
to all six questions approaches zero, yet fully half the
youngest subjects in the unseen condition did so.
It is important to see that in all conditions correct
responding on the belief question reflects genuine
understanding of the deception that is central to the plot.
Evidence for this claim comes from the fact that
consistently correct responding to the false belief
questions (across all three conditions) was accompanied by
consistently correct responding to the ignorance and
knowledge questions. Of the 22 3-year-old subjects who
answered both false belief questions correctly, 21 (95%)
answered both ignorance questions correctly as well, while
19 (86%) were consistently right on the knowledge question.
An ANOVA for age, condition (seen, unseen, standard)
and question type (ignorance, knowledge) yielded the
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expected main effect of age (F=29.9, df=1,90, p<.001).
Clearly, 4-year-olds are better at these questions than 3-
year-olds. The ANOVA also revealed a two-way interaction of
condition by question (F=3.8, df=2,90, p<.03) and a three-
way interaction of age by condition by question (F=6.4,
df=2,90, p<.003). These interaction effects seem to be due
to the superior performance of 3-year-olds in the standard
group on the knowledge question. In this condition
virtually everyone answered the knowledge question
correctly, presumably, as mentioned above, because here the
knowledgeable puppet has actually hidden the object.
With respect to this, and to the meaning of children's
performance on the ignorance and knowledge questions (both
of the form 'does the actor know x?'), there is some recent
evidence that children use the term 'know' in several ways,
much as adults do. One way is to refer to an epistemic
state and it is this sense which studies hope to tap when
they query children about what an actor knows. However,
Perner (1988) has recently claimed that children sometimes
take the question to be asking how 'familiar' an actor is
with, say, the location of an object. If this is true, then
children are simply answering a different question than the
one we are asking them -- and all bets are off with respect
to our hypotheses. This suggests that we should remain
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somewhat skeptical about the ignorance and knowledge
questions as indicators of the child's understanding of
epistemic states.
Discussion
With respect to Hypothesis 1, it seems clear that the
source of the Frog's false belief had no effect on
children's responses. Subjects did not perform better in
the seen condition of the testimony task than on the
standard task.
With respect to Hypothesis 2, it is also clear that
failure on the standard false belief task is not due to the
change in truth status of Frog's belief. Again, subjects
performed no better in the seen condition of Experiment 2
where no such change is required than in the standard task.
Hypothesis 3 is confirmed. For 3-year-olds, the
difference in the source of the subject's true belief had a
significant effect on responses to the test question.
Performance on the unseen condition confirms the suggestion
found in the Johnson & Maratsos data that 3-year-olds can
successfully attribute a false belief to a deceived actor.
It is important to recall that all responses to the
reality control question were correct. This ensures that 3-
year-olds who succeeded on the false belief question were
not pointing to the closet because they mistakenly believed
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the airplane to be hidden there. On the contrary; they
claimed that the plane was really in the box, but that Frog
believed it to be in the closet.
Clearly, the older children performed better on the
task. Nevertheless, performance on the unseen condition of
the present study affords genuine evidence of the ability of
most 3-year-olds to conceive of and successfully attribute
false beliefs.
These results have implications for the accounts which
have been proposed to explain children's failure on the
standard false belief task. Perner (1988), for instance, has
claimed that young subjects in the false belief task claim
that the deceived actor will look for the object in its
actual location because they consider where the actor would
fulfill the goal -- locating the object in the real world in
which the deceived actor is operating, not in the
counterfactual world of the false belief. Wellman and
Bartsch (in press) make a related claim that the child uses
desire-reasoning rather than belief-reasoning when
considering where the actor will look or what he thinks: if
he wants to find the object, he will look for it where it
is. Neither of these strategies, however, would predict
children's success in the unseen condition.
Children's failure on the standard and seen tasks is
best understood as the result of a one-way correspondence
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principle which states that beliefs correspond to reality.
In representational terms, this leads to the child's
inability to mark as true (for anyone) any model of reality
which conflicts with his or her own model of reality
(Perner, 1988).
If children fail the standard false belief task because
they use an erroneous correspondence rule, why do they
succeed in the unseen condition of the present study? In
terms of 3-year-olds' performance, the unseen condition is
similar to the tasks of Wellman and Bartsch discussed above.
To see what all these tasks have in common, a brief summary
reminder of these tasks is in order.
Task 1) Inferred belief control. Here subjects were
told that there were marbles in locations x and y, but that
the actor had seen the marbles only in location x, not
location y. They were asked where the actor would look for
the marbles.
Task 2) Discrepant belief. In this condition subjects
saw that there were objects in both locations x and y, but
were told that the actor thought the object was only in
location x, not location y. They were asked where the actor
would look for the object.
Task 3) Not-own. Here subjects were told that the
object might be in location x or in location y. They were
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then asked where they thought it was. Whichever location
they chose, they were told that the actor thought it was in
the other location. They were then asked where the actor
would look for the object. (Recall that in Perner and
Leekam's control study, subjects were also asked where they
themselves would look for it; they succeeded on this control
question as well.)
Task 4) Unseen condition of present study. In this
condition subjects were told that the object was in location
y, but that the actor was told it was in location x. They
were asked where the actor thinks the object is.
These four tasks differ from the standard false belief
tasks in terms of the child's representation of the true
state of affairs. Consider the following: in Tasks 1 and 2
above, the object is truly in both locations; in Task 3, the
object's true location is unspecified; and in Task 4, the
salience of the object's true location is minimized. On all
these tasks the child succeeds. This pattern of results is
sensible if we accept a slight revision of Perner's
constraint above:
So long as children are (reasonably, to some
threshhold) certain about their model of reality, they
will not mark as true (for anyone) any model of reality
which conflicts with it.
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In other words, when the child is certain of the truth, he
or she will reject all conflicting beliefs. When uncertain,
the child will evaluate them. In the standard false belief
task, the child has seen the object in location x and is
certain it is there, so the actor's false belief is rejected
out of hand. In the Wellman and Bartsch tasks summarized
above (Tasks 1-3), the child is not constrained by his or
her own true model of reality. Why? In Tasks 1 and 2, the
actor's reality model is not false (the object really is in
the location he thinks it's in), so it needn't be rejected
out of hand. In Task 3, the child doesn't know the object's
true location, so the constraint is not operative. In Task
4, the unseen condition of Experiment 1, subjects do of
course know the single correct location; we are assured of
this by their uniformly correct answers to the reality
control question. Nevertheless, they know it in a different
way, a less reliable way. In the absence of certainty about
the true state of affairs, children reason out the answer.
(It's of interest here that several children asked to look
inside the box, while another whispered to me
conspiratorially "is it really in there?") In the unseen
condition, then, the child seems to accept the puppet's
statement as only provisionally true. It's worth pointing
out that not all verbal reports would be accepted as only
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provisionally true; presumably, most verbal reports would be
considered trustworthy. In our experiment, it may have been
not only the source of the child's information, but the fact
that better information was available (the closed container
was on the table, in easy reach for opening--yet not opened)
which led the child to only provisional acceptance.
Whatever it was that caused the information to be accepted
as only provisionally true, however, the important point
remains: in this case, the correspondence rule is not
invoked -- and something else is. What is it?
To answer this question, notice that even if the
correspondence rule is not used, as in the unseen condition,
this is no guarantee of success; the child still needs to
use belief/desire causal reasoning in order to succeed on
the task. That's just because the possibility of
representing a false belief does not guarantee the ability
to figure out what it is. Clearly, the child in the unseen
condition still needs to make the inference from what the
puppet was told to what the puppet will think. That 3-year-
olds do so is evidence that they do in fact understand the
causal link between testimony and belief; that is, the young
child has a causal principle that being told that x leads to
believing that x. This result is in keeping with recent
evidence that 3-year-olds understand the causal relationship
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between seeing that x and believing that x. (Pillow, in
press; Pratt and Bryant, 1988; Wellman and Bartsch, in
press).
The claim that 3-year-olds have some understanding of
false belief is also supported by a recent study of Bartsch
& Wellman (in press). They presented preschoolers with
stories in which a deceived actor is shown searching for an
object in the wrong place. Subjects were asked to explain
why the actor was searching in the wrong place. Although
these same 3-year-olds could not attribute false beliefs in
the standard prediction task, they were quite impressive in
explaining the actor's search by appealing to his false
belief. In this task, then, children were able to reason
backwards from a character's action to a false belief which
might have sensibly caused it.
'False' photographs and false beliefs
A series of recent studies (Zaitchik, in press) on the
child's understanding of photographs suggests that the early
correspondence rule may not be specific to beliefs. In
these tasks, preschoolers are presented with a problem
similar to the false belief task: An actor takes a
photograph of an object in location x; the object is then
moved to location y. Subjects are asked: "In the picture,
where is the object?" Preschoolers typically answer
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incorrectly, pointing to the object's actual location. This
mistake, so similar to the mistake on the false belief task,
suggests a common source. As suggested above about beliefs,
I think the child has enough understanding of the causal
processes involved to correctly determine the contents of
the photograph, but this knowledge is not accessed in the
task or else the inference it leads to is rejected. Why?
Possibly the most salient aspect of photographs is just the
way they differ from drawings. Drawings do represent
possible states of affairs -- but they need not ever have
represented true states of affairs. Photos may be special
in that they directly reflect the states of affairs that
caused them. As such they have a hold on the world that most
other representations don't have. That is, the child takes
the photograph to be true to reality. There is evidence
that 6-year-olds, at least, appreciate this special status
of photographs. O'Connor, Beilin, and Kose (1981) presented
children with either photographs or drawings of an incorrect
solution to a conservation of liquid task. They found that
subjects were more likely to choose the illogical outcome as
the true outcome when it was represented in a photograph
than in a drawing. The authors have argued from these
results that children believe in the fidelity of
photographs. Once again, it seems, the child's belief in
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the correspondence of the representation to reality leads to
error.
The False Belief Task
Recall that Bartsch and Wellman (in press) have
evidence that young children can explain action by appeal to
false belief before they can correctly predict action by
appeal to false belief. Considering children's failure on
the prediction tasks, the authors claim that the problem
stems from the tendency to predict action on the basis of an
actor's desires. Specifically, they claim that although 3-
year-olds can reason about beliefs as causes of action, 2-
year-olds cannot. Two-year-olds can, however, reason about
desires as causes of action. The problem in the false
belief task, they argue, is that desire reasoning conflicts
with belief reasoning. In this case, most 3-year-olds will
opt for the more entrenched desire reasoning. Although
there is considerable evidence that 2-year-olds can in fact
predict action on the basis of an actor's desires (Wellman,
1989) it seems unlikely that it is solely the child's
reliance on desire reasoning which accounts for failure on
the false belief task. First, notice that this account
predicts no problem in inferring the false belief itself; it
is only in predicting where the actor will look that the
child is faced with a conflict. The test question used in
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both the seen and standard conditions, however, does not
require predicting action -- only inferring belief. Still
the child fails. Second, if the conflict for the child is
between the desire and the belief, one should find no such
problem with photos. Here there are no desires at play.
There is only the representation and the reality -- and
still the child fails. Third, in the present study, the
difference between the seen and the unseen condition did not
involve a change in the actor's desires, so there is no
reason why the child should use desire reasoning in the seen
condition and belief reasoning in the unseen condition. It
was clearly the subject's own representation of reality that
was changed from one condition to the other. It seems then
that the child's problem is not in the conflict of beliefs
and desires, but beliefs and reality.
To conclude, I would agree with the claim that the 3-
year-old is in a state of conceptual tension, but the source
of the tension is this: the child is making the transition
from reasoning in accordance with an early one-way
correspondence rule about beliefs and reality--an assumption
of the veridicality of beliefs-- to causal reasoning about
beliefs, that is, to reasoning from an actor's perceptual
experience to his or her belief. For the most part, of
course, these two principles live harmoniously, leading to
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the same inference; it is only in the case of false beliefs
that the child must choose between them. In a way, the
claim that the child has principles which sometimes lead to
contradictory inferences is not surprising. It is clear
that the child's theory of mind is undergoing change. There
is no reason to expect this change to be neat, no reason to
think that at any given moment the child's theory will be
perfectly coherent and non-contradictory. We may expect
this of our best scientific theories, perhaps, but it is
probably too much to hope for in our developing naive
theories.
By the time the child is 4 years old, the understanding
of the causal determinants of belief is firmly in place and
is evident in a large variety of tasks. The present study,
however, provides some evidence of this understanding even
in 3-year-olds. In conjunction with the results of Johnson
and Maratsos (1978) cited above, it offers evidence that,
under some conditions, even 3-year-olds can represent and
reason about false beliefs and their effects on human
action.
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Appendix A
Second skit for seen and unseen conditions
Dog: I just got a new watch. I love to wear it on my arm.
Ernie is coming over soon. If he finds out about my
new watch he'll want to wear it. But I want to wear
it. My watch is in this box, but I won't tell Ernie
that; I'll make something up. I'll tell him that
my watch is in this bag. Yeah, that's what
I'll say. Really my watch is in this box,
but I'll tell Ernie it's in the bag.
Ernie: Hi, Dog. Where's your watch?
Dog: Here, in this bag.
Ernie: Oh, thanks for telling me.
Experimenter: Dog told Ernie that his watch is in the bag.
Reality Q: Where is the watch really?
Deceived Actor's Ignorance Q: Does Ernie know that?
Deceived Actor's Belief Q: Where does Ernie think the watch
is?
Deceiving Actor's Knowledge Q: Does Dog know that the watch
is in the box?
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Appendix B
Second skit for standard condition
Dog: Look, Ernie; I just got a new watch. I love to wear it
on my arm. It's here in my box. Wanna see it?
Ernie: yeah, that's nice, Mr. Dog. Well, I have to go buy
some milk now, but when I come back I'll wear your
watch.
Dog: Hmm, when Ernie comes back, he'll want to wear my
watch. But I'll want to wear it myself; I don't want
him to wear it. Hmm, I know; I'll hide the watch.
Ernie saw my watch here in this box, but I'll hide it
here in this bag. Dog hides the watch in the bag.
Experimenter: Ernie is out buying milk. Before, when Ernie
was here with Dog, he saw the watch in the box.
Reality Q: Well, where is the watch now?
Deceived Actor's Ignorance Q: Does Ernie know that?
Deceived Actor's Belief Q: Where does he think it is?
Deceiving Actor's Knowledge Q: How about Dog? Does he know
that the watch in this bag?
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Table 2
The deceived actor's belief question
Percentage of correct responses
3-year-olds
unseen
seen
standard
4-year-olds
unseen
seen
standard
72
44
44
84
75
94
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Table 3
The deceived actor's belief question
Number of S's who got zero, one, or both trials correct
2 1 
3's unseen 10 3 3
3's seen 5 4 7
3's standard 7 0 9
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Table 4
The deceived actor's ignorance and the deceiving actor's
knowledge questions
Percentage correct
ig
chance=
3s unseen
seen
standard
4s unseen
seen
standard
50
81
72
50
94
88
100
kn both qs all 4*
(% trials)
50 25 6
69 56 50
59 43 33
97 46 43
97 93 86
100 87 87
100 100 100
*(% of Subjects correct on 2 trials)
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TABLE 5
Ignorance questions
Number of S's who got zero, one, or two correct
2 1 0
3's unseen
3's seen
3's standard
12 2 2
11 1 4
8 0 8
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TABLE 6
Knowledge questions
Number of S's who got zero, one, or two correct
2 1 0
3's unseen
3's seen
3's standard
11 0 5
7 5 4
15 1 0
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